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  JOHN WOODRUM, MARGO WOODRUM, LARRY DEAN WOODRUM, and SHERYL
         WOODRUM, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WOODWARD COUNTY,
      OKLAHOMA; MICKIE GARRISON, in her individual capacity as
      social worker, Woodward County, Oklahoma; ELIZABETH ZARELLA,
     in her individual capacity as child welfare supervisor and
        social worker, Woodward County, Oklahoma; SAN LUIS OBISPO
             COUNTY, CALIFORNIA; MARIE JACKSON, in her individual
          capacity as social worker; ROBERT COEN, in his individual
                 capacity as social worker; and JAYNE ROSSON,
                         Defendants-Appellees

                             Nos. 86-6019; 87-5558
              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    866 F.2d 1121;  1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 568; 13 Fed. R. Serv.
                           3d (Callaghan) 390
November 4, 1987, Argued and Submitted January 25, 1989,  Filed

PRIOR HISTORY:   [**1]

   Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, D.C. No. CV-85-5117-LEW, Laughlin E.
Waters, District Judge, Presiding.

COUNSEL: Patricial J. Barry, Grover City, California, for the
plaintiffs-appellants.

   Pamela K. Padley, Assistant General Counsel, for Oklahoma
Department of Human Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the
defendants-appellees Mickie garrison and Elizabeth Zarella.

   Robert J. Feldhake, Musick, peeler & Garrett, Los Angeles,
California, for the defendants-appellees Marie Jackson, Robert Coen
and the County of San Luis Obispo.

OPINIONBY: NELSON

OPINION:   [*1123]   OPINION

   NELSON, Circuit Judge:

   Larry Woodrum was awarded physical custody of his two children,
Trina and Larry John, on November 17, 1983 in San Diego Superior
Court. This action arises from a series of child abuse reports made
by Jayne Rosson, mother of the children, and subsequent
investigations conducted by both the Oklahoma Department of Human
Services ("Oklahoma") and the County of San Luis Obispo Social
Services Department ("SLO") and Pismo Beach Police Department. We
conclude that the actions of various child protective services
employees are immune from suit, and that Larry Woodrum n1 failed to
allege   [**2]   any cognizable damage to a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in the care and custody of his children
sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. @ 1983.
                                                         PAGE  155
             866 F.2d 1121, *1123; 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 568, **2;       LEXSEE                       13 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan)
390

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   n1 At oral argument, the Woodrums' counsel abandoned the claim
that the grandparents had a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the care and custody of the children. Therefore we need
not reach the issue whether the child abuse investigations and
removal infringed upon the constitutional rights of the
grandparents. Counsel concede at oral argument that the actual
alleged tort against the grandparents consisted of a state law
defamation claim. Moreover, because John Woodrum was never charged
with any crime, he has no due process right to a hearing regarding
the molestation allegations. We therefore affirm the district
court's determination that the grandparents have failed to state a
@ 1983 claim.

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   Additionally we must consider whether appellants' pleadings
warranted the imposition of sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. We
affirm the district court's dismissal of the second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim, but we reverse the award of
sanctions against appellants' counsel with respect to the district
[**3]   court proceedings.

   BACKGROUND

   When Trina and Larry John Woodrum visited Jayne Rosson in
Oklahoma, she complained to child protective services in San Luis
Obispo County that the custodial grandfather, John Woodrum, was
sexually molesting Trina. SLO investigated the charge, determined
that there was an insufficient basis to prosecute, and closed the
case, notifying Larry Woodrum that the case was dropped. When the
children next visited their mother in the summer of 1984, she filed
a child molestation report with Oklahoma Human Services workers,
based on Trina's statements. OKlahoma social worker Mickie Garrison
investigated by interviewing both children and by requiring an
examination by an Oklahoma doctor. Ms. Garrison sent a telegram to
Woodrum asking him to call her. When he did, she advised him of his
need to retain counsel. Rosson then filed a petition in Oklahoma
state court seeking custody of the children. The petition was
supported by affidavits made by Garrison and by Woodward County
District Attorney Tom Gruder, who is not a party in this action.

   The court issued a temporary change in custody on August 2,
1984, pending an August 30 hearing. Woodrum and his lawyer were
present  [**4]   and participated at the August 30 hearing to amend
custody. The Oklahoma state court stayed the proceedings on the
basis of forum non conveniens and allowed Oklahoma 60 days to
transfer the case to California, the children's legal domicile. The
Oklahoma court awarded legal custody to OKlahoma during the 60 day
stay, but kept physical custody with the father, subject to a
change in living arrangements.   SLO began another investigation, based on the reports
transferred from Oklahoma. Trina was removed temporarily from the
home of Woodrums fiance, Sheryl Rockvoy, on October 5 pursuant to
SLO's abuse investigation. No juvenile petition   [*1124]   was
ever filed by SLO and no charges were ever brought. Larry Woodrum
retained physical and legal custody of his children after the
Oklahoma Court dismissed the custody petition on November 28, 1984.
After the children moved to Hawaii, Rosson filed a child abuse
report with Hawaii social services. Oklahoma social worker Garrison
sent the Hawaii agency a letter

    PAGE  156               866 F.2d 1121, *1124; 1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS 568, **4;        LEXSEE                       13 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 390

confirming the previous reports and investigations. All social
service agencies closed their investigations without pursuing
charges.

   Woodrum and his parents filed an initial complaint in August
1985  [**5] alleging violations of their civil rights under 42
U.S.C. @ 1985(3) and @ 1983. The complaint also contained pendent
state claims including allegations of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and conspiracy to deprive the Woodrums of the
right to see the children. The Woodrums voluntarily dismissed the
first complaint and filed an amended complaint which added and
deleted various defendants. The District Court dismissed with
prejudice all pendent state claims, the @ 1985(3) claim, and all
claims against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services. The court
also dismissed Woodrum's @ 1983 claims but granted leave to amend
to allege a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.
Woodrum did not appeal the dismissal of the first amended
complaint.

   Woodrum filed a second amended complaint in January 1986. He,
his wife and his parents allege that the investigations violated
Woodrum's and his parents' due process and privacy rights and they
seek $ 1 million in damages and declaratory relief from Oklahoma,
SLO, their employees and Rosson. The second amended complaint
asserts that state and municipal agencies as well as employees of
these agencies violated the Woodrums' @   [**6]   1983 rights. The
district court dismissed the second amended complaint because
Woodrum failed to show any damage resulting from the
investigations. The court held that neither Woodrum nor his parents
had been deprived of any constitutionally protected liberty
interest in his children because Larry Woodrum retained custody.
The court concluded that the investigations did not constitute a
criminal proceeding entitling the grandparents to any due process
hearing rights.

   The district court imposed sanctions against the appellants for
(1) bringing damages claims clearly barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, (2) failing to delete a @ 1985 claim when it was clear
that Woodrum could not prove any class-based discrimination, and(3) persisting in @ 1983 allegations without meeting the threshold
requirements to state a claim. Sanctions were awarded against the
attorney in the amount of $ 6,000.

   DISCUSSION

   A dismissal for failure to state a claim is subject to de novo
review. Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir.
1985). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff would be entitled to no
relief under any state of facts  [**7]   that could be proved.
Smith v. Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct. 311 (1987). This case is controlled by Meyers v. Contra Costa
County Dep't. of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 98 (1987).

   I. FAILURE TO SHOW DAMAGES UNDER @ 1983

   A parent's interest in the custody and care of his or her
children is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, such
that due process must be afforded prior to a termination of
parental status. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982);
Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). "The
relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an
interest
            PAGE  157               866 F.2d 1121, *1124; 1989 U.S.
App. LEXIS 568, **7;        LEXSEE                       13 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 390

in liberty entitled to constitutional protection." Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983).

   "Existing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent establish
that a [*1125]   parent has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the companionship and society of his or her child. The
state's interference with that liberty interest without due process
of law is remediable under section 1983." Kelson, 767 F.2d at 655.

   While a constitutional liberty interest in the maintenance of
the familial relationship  [**8]   exists, this right is not
absolute. The interest of the parents must be balanced against the
interests of the state and, when conflicting, against the interests
of the children. See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th
Cir. 1985) (no right to unlimited exercise of religious beliefs
regarding corporal punishment); see also Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d
1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (liberty interest "limited by the compelling
governmental interest in protection of minor children, particularly
in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as
against the parents themselves"), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 97
(1987). In this case, child welfare workers clearly were acting
pursuant to state statutes authorizing investigations and the
initiation of dependency proceedings upon reported child abuse.
Cal.Civ.Code @ 232.5; Cal.Penal Code @@ 11160 et seq.;
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21 @@ 845-46 (West Supp. 1986).   Failure to investigate or Intervene when child abuse is
suspected can subject a state and its employees to liability. See
Krikorian v. Barry, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 1214, 242 Cal.Rptr. 312,
313 (Cal. App. 1987); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d
[**9]   503, 508-11 (3rd Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d
185, 191-194 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985);
Mammo v. Arizona, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1983); Turner v.
District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. App. 1987) (special
relationship requiring higher duty of care created by filing of
child abuse report). Woodrum does not challenge the
constitutionality of the child abuse reporting or investigation
statutes. He only challenges the constitutionality of the
investigations conducted pursuant to admittedly constitutional
state statutes.

   Once it is established that a liberty interest can be weighed
against competing governmental interests, it is not enough merely
to allege that the government interfered with the family
relationship. Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; see Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (states have a legitimate interest in
separating neglectful parents from their children). Woodrum's
allegation of a violation of liberty rights thus devolves into
either a claim that the government acted in a way which violated
the substantive protections of the due process clause or a claim
that the State failed to provide adequate protections [**10]
against wrongful deprivations. See Fontana, 818 F.2d at 1415. With
one exception discussed below, Woodrum's allegations fall within
the category of procedural due process claims.

   Whether Woodrum's admittedly constitutional liberty interest was
violated by any of the child abuse investigations or by the custody
determinations requires an analysis of the procedures to be
afforded a parent when the government investigates child abuse
reports. See e.g., Smith v. Organization of foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See also Little v.
Streater 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18
               PAGE  158              866 F.2d 1121, *1125; 1989
U.S. App. LEXIS 568, **10;        LEXSEE                       13
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 390

(1981). In this case, the defendants' actions at most resulted in
a court-ordered modification of parental rights, but the
investigations did not terminate such rights. Because a report of
child abuse triggers the investigation requirements pursuant to
Oklahoma and California statutes, the reports here raised a valid
governmental interest sufficient for the social workers to
intervene for the welfare of the children.

   The appellants allege that the appellees' actions associated
with the removal of Trina Woodrum from Sheryl Rockvoy's home
[**11]   violated several sections of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code. They argue that these allegations are sufficient
to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. @ 1983.   [*1126] Mere negligenceor lack of due care by state officials in the conduct of their
duties does not trigger the substantial due process protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore does not state a claim under
section 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). In Daniels the Court
said that the question remains open as to "whether something less
than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence,
is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause."
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n. 3. However, in Wood v. Ostrander, 851
F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. July 13, 1988), this court held that an
intentional assertion of government power that tended to show a
disregard of the plaintiff's physical safety may amount to gross
negligence, recklessness or deliberate indifference sufficient to
overcome the Daniels or Davidson bar and state a claim under
section 1983. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1214-15. Wood is consistent with
the decisions of a majority [**12]   of courts of appeals that have
addressed the issue of whether recklessness or gross negligence
could constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest under the due
process clause. Dell Fargo v. City of San Bautista, 857 F.2d 638,
641, n. 5 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1988). In this case, however, we
conclude that the allegations contained in the complaint do not
rise to the level required to state a claim of gross negligence
under @ 1983.

   Because we conclude that plaintiff has not stated a proper claim
under 42 U.S.C. @ 1983, we need not decide whether the social
workers and the SLO are immune from suit.

   II. ROSSON'S LIABILITY UNDER @ 1983

   The claims against Jayne Rosson primarily are allegations of
defamation under state law. A defamation claim was not pleaded in
the complaint. The district court dismissed with prejudice all
pendant state claims. The district court dismissed with prejudice
the state law conspiracy claims alleged in the first amended
complaint. Woodrum should have appealed that initial dismissal on
the merits, instead of amending the complaint and recharacterizing
the @ 1985(3) claims. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 n.2
(9th Cir. 1987); see also Montana   [**13]    v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Thus, to the extent that Woodrum alleges that
Rosson was part of a conspiracy to deprive the grandparents of
their rights to associate with the children, that claim is barred
from reconsideration by this court. See C.D. Anderson & Co., Inc.
v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1987).

   To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services
employees under @ 1983, an agreement or meeting of minds to violate
the Woodrums' constitutional rights must be shown. See Fonda v.
Gray, 707 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1983). Rosson argued persuasively
below n2 that the most that could be shown was that Rosson
                                                              PAGE
159              866 F.2d 1121, *1126; 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 568,
**13;        LEXSEE                       13 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(Callaghan) 390                       deceived the social workers by filing false reports against the
Woodrums, but that the Woodrums could allege no specific facts to
show any agreement between Rosson and any of the named defendants.
Moreover, Woodrum does not show that any actual deprivation of his
constitutional rights resulted from the alleged conspiracy. See
Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 745 F.2d
606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985)
(conspiracy allegation, even if established, does not give rise to
liability under  [**14] @ 1983 unless there is an actual
deprivation of civil rights). Woodrum's conclusory allegations that
Rosson and the social workers conspired do not support a claim for
violation of his constitutional rights under @ 1983. See Aldabe v.
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 587
F.Supp. 631 (D. Cal. 1984) (allegations of conspiracy must be
supported by material facts, not merely conclusory statements). See
also Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 14 (D.C.Cir.) (civil rights
statute does not apply to all conspiratorial [*1127]   tortious
interferences with the rights of others, but only to those
motivated by some class-based animus), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1984).
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   n2 Rosson was not represented by counsel on appeal and did not
file an appellate brief.

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   Rosson's child molestation reports are entitled to immunity
under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code @ 306. See also Cal. Penal Code @
11172. Rosson's filing of the custody petition is entitled to
absolute immunity. See Castenada, 832 F.2d at 125-26. Therefore, we
affirm the district court's dismissal of the action against Rosson
both for failure to state a claim and because Rosson's other
actions are entitled to  [**15]   immunity.

   III. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

   The review of sanctions imposed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 requires
three separate inquiries. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d
823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). First, whether specific conduct violated
Rule 11 is a legal issue reviewable de novo. Calif. Architectural
Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466,
1472 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 698 (1987). Second, any
disputed factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986). Third, the appropriateness of
the sanction imposed is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lemos
v. Fencl, 828 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1987).

   Pursuant to the 1983 Amendments to Rule 11, an attorney who
signs a motion or paper in federal court "warrants that the motion
is well-grounded in fact, that it is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not filed for an improper purpose."Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1536. An objective standard of
reasonableness applies to determinations of  [**16]   frivolousness
as well as to improper purpose. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830-31. "The
key question in assessing frivolousness is whether a complaint
states an arguable claim -- not whether the pleader is correct in
his perception of the law." Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.,
827 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1987).

    PAGE  160              866 F.2d 1121, *1127; 1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS 568, **16;        LEXSEE                       13 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 390

   The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule 11 state that the
Rule 11 amendments attempt to expand the equitable doctrine
permitting the court to award expenses to a litigant whose opponent
acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See,
e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980).
The district court found that appellants intentionally persisted in
advocating meritless claims by (1) claiming a @ 1985(3) violation
after admitting that they could not prove the requisite class-based
discriminatory animus necessary for stating a claim, (2) claiming
damages against Oklahoma in the lace of an obvious Eleventh
Amendment bar to monetary relief, and (3) arguing @ 1983 claims
without alleging facts to support a deprivation of a constitutional
right. The district court found that the second amended complaint
required the appellees to defend   [**17]   "against actions where
the law and this Court have clearly indicated that no claims were
merited."

   Mindful of the potential chilling effects on civil rights
plaintiffs who argue in good faith for the modification or
extension of rights and remedies under @ 1983, we cannot conclude
that all of the claims in the complaint were wholly without merit.
See Hurd v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1987)
(noting that the Advisory Committee states that Rule 11 is not
intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories); see also Lemos, 828 F.2d at
619 (complaint "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law cannot
violate Rule 11 even if it is filed for an improper purpose.")
While we agree that Woodrum's insistence in bringing a @ 1985(3)
claim after conceding the lack of class-based animus may constitute
sanctionable conduct standing alone, we believe that the @ 1983
claims are not so lacking in plausibility as to make counsel's
decision to sign and certify the complaint sanctionable under Rule
11. Although counsel ultimately   [*1128] failed to adduce
sufficient support  [**18]   for the allegations, the action was
not completely baseless under a standard of objective
reasonableness. See Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503,
1508 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, we reverse the district court's
imposition of sanctions. However, Woodrum is not entitled to any
fee award for prevailing on the sanctions issue. Jensen v. City of
San Jose, 806 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986). n3
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   n3 In addition, we deny Woodrum's motion for sanctions against
appellees on appeal. SLO's and Oklahoma's arguments on appeal are
well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. The motion
itself is close to being frivolous, but this court will take no
sanctioning actions at this time.

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   AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.